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   Abstract                  
South Africa lost more than 890,000 jobs, but saw an increase in the 
number of skilled workers from 1989 to 1999. We argue that this is the 
consequence of well-documented acute apartheid-era distortions which led 
to a current coordination failure where (i) firms are locked into a mostly skill-
intensive technology where they have very little demand for semi-skilled 
and unskilled labour, and (ii) there are too few semi-skilled and skilled 
blacks. It follows that the average level of blacks' human capital is too low 
for firms to adopt a technology which makes intensive use of less skilled 
workers in the production process. A firm cannot unilaterally change 
technology because current skilled (mostly white) workers would lose and 
move to other firms. All of this points to a missing market for semi-skilled 
workers. Wealth redistribution and public investments in both the quantity 
and quality of education are shown to be Pareto-improving. 
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There is no place for him [a black man] in the European community above the level 
of certain forms of labour. For that reason it is of no avail to him to receive a 
training which has as its aim absorption into the European community, where he 
cannot be absorbed. 
 
[Hendrik French Verwoerd, Minister of Native Affairs (1950-1959) and Prime Minister of 
South Africa (1959-1966), Senate Debates, 7 June 1954] 
 
   1. Introduction 
 
This paper explains two related features of post-apartheid South Africa. First, while 
16 percent of all the formal sector jobs were lost between 1989 and 1999 (SAIRR 
2002), new jobs were created for highly skilled workers.1 What growth there has 
been in informal sector employment seems to have been in very low-skilled 
activities only. It is expected that in the future, employment of skilled workers will 
continue to increase while semi-skilled and unskilled positions, mostly held by 
blacks, will continue to diminish (Human Sciences Research Council 1999). This 
implies that South Africa is moving away from using semi-skilled labour towards 
skilled labour intensive processes in the formal sector, and very low skill work in 
the informal sector. 
 
Such a technological choice has serious implications because most blacks are not 
sufficiently educated to work in skilled jobs.2 Thus the lack of semi-skilled 
opportunities means that in effect South Africa is still a place where (in Verwoerd's 
words) there is “no place” for most blacks “above the level of certain forms of 
labour”. Second, in contrast to most other developing countries (Psacharopoulos 
and Patrinos 2002), there appear to be no returns to primary education in South 
Africa (Moll 1998, Butcher and Rouse 2001). In other words, acquiring that level of 




                                                                
 
 
1 Fedderke, Henderson, Mariotti and Vaze (2000) document the increased skills intensity in the 
  manufacturing sector between 1970 and 1997, and the fall in employment after 1990. 
 
2 In a case study of a textile manufacturing firm, holding education and other factors constant, Frijters 
  (1999) estimates lower average productivity for black females compared to Asian females. 
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We draw from the skill-biased technology literature (Acemoglu 2002) to construct a 
model which explains the persistence of these two features into post-apartheid 
South Africa. The model highlights a coordination failure that results in a missing 
market for less skilled (semi-skilled and unskilled) workers. A lack of appropriately 
trained workers explains why South African firms have chosen technologies that 
rely on skilled (mainly white) workers. In equilibrium firms do not change to a new 
technology which uses both semi-skilled and skilled workers unless it is Pareto-
improving for current skilled workers. There is an endogenous threshold level of 
black human capital when this is the case. Any firm which changes technology 
below the threshold would loose all its skilled workers and perish. Below the 
threshold, firms continue using the exclusively skilled-technology and they have no 
demand for semi-skilled workers. Such workers only find unskilled jobs, namely 
menial jobs in the formal sector or in the informal sector. For blacks, the absence of 
job opportunities and high poverty rates undermine their incentives and ability to 
acquire skills. 
 
Although similar models have been applied to other settings, ours is to our 
knowledge the first application to South Africa, and also the first to link coordination 
failure and absence of returns to education. Our explanation complements existing 
ones and is an important contribution to the South African debate. Indeed, existing 
explanations, such as those blaming labour market distortions for the poor labour 
market performance, cannot explain the extent of 
the collapse of semi-skilled positions in South Africa. The policy implications differ 
from previous ones. A big education push similar to that envisaged by the South 
African government's Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) is 
appropriate. The RDP acknowledged that apartheid-created distortions were 
undermining the economy. It proposed large expenditure in key sectors like health 
and education, and asset redistribution. However, the RDP became subservient to 
the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution programme (GEAR) whose main goal 
is macroecononomic stability. GEAR involves lower expenditure and asset 
redistribution than the original RDP (Marais 2001). 
 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 develops a model which is 
consistent with the characteristics of post-apartheid South Africa. We solve for the 
equilibrium share of black skilled workers in Section 3. Section 4 discusses human 
capital and technological choice in South Africa in greater detail. Finally section 5 
summarises our results, discusses policy implications and concludes. All figures 
and proofs are in the Appendix. 
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   2. Model 
 
Consider a two-period economy populated by blacks and whites, where each agent 
lives for two periods and dies at the end of the second period. In addition, each 
agent is endowed with one unit of non-leisure time in each period, and  units of 
wealth which for simplicity yields units of the consumption good.3  Wealth 
endowment is distributed over a bounded support for blacks and for 
whites. For simplicity we assume that no white is poorer than any black so as to 
capture the well documented wealth inequality in South Africa (Bhorat, Leibbrandt, 
Maziya, van der Berg and Woolard 2001, Michaud and Vencatachellum 2003). 
 
One consequence of apartheid-era policies is the stark difference between 
educational attainment of blacks and whites (Fedderke and Luiz 2002). Using the 
1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards and Development, we calculate that 
71 per cent of black labour market participants have at most attended school up to 
standard 7, while the comparative figure for whites is 5 percent. So as to reflect 
education inequality in South Africa, we assume that in the first period blacks are 
less-skilled, while all whites are skilled. In other words, whites are wealthy enough, 
and benefited sufficiently from apartheid-era policies, to have acquired enough 
training. Of the less-skilled, the semi-skilled have some education or training, but 
insufficient for skilled work. Such individuals may have primary and even some 
secondary education. 
 
Unskilled workers are assumed not to have completed primary education and 
cannot acquire any further education. This may occur because their human capital 
is too low, and the costs to educate them so that they can undertake further 
education are prohibitively high.4  We can therefore focus on education decisions 
for semi-skilled blacks. In the first period, a black semi-skilled agent can either 
allocate all of his time to produce a numéraire good or acquire full-time training (i.e. 
attend school). Those who attend school can work as skilled workers in the second 
                                                                
 
3 Our framework is similar to Dessy and Vencatachellum (2003) who investigate how coordination  
   failure impacts on child labour. 
 
4 This assumption allows us to focus on semi-skilled workers. Future work may investigate the  
   simultaneous decisions of semi-skilled and unskilled workers to obtain training. This would  
   endogenise the measure of semi-skilled workers. Such a change would require the simultaneous  
   solution to a system of two fixed-point equations which would significantly increase the complexity of  
   the model and equilibrium results. However,  we do not anticipate that it would change the qualitative  
   properties of our results because a coordination problem will still arise. 
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period. Attending school here means that the agent acquires sufficient education to 
be a skilled worker. 
 
   2.1 Technologies 
 
The homogenous good is produced either in the formal or informal sector. The 
informal sector differs from the formal one in that there are no human capital 
externalities, and wages are much lower in the informal sector. The evidence 
suggests that South Africa's informal sector is predominantly unskilled (see Berry 
(2001) and Section 4). Unskilled agents can either work in the informal sector or in 
menial formal sector jobs. Firms in the formal sector use a number of unskilled 
workers which is determined by their infrastructure. One could think of unskilled 
workers, for instance, as office cleaners and gardeners who do not contribute to 
the actual production process. Unskilled workers are viewed here as a fixed cost 
which must be incurred for firms to operate.  
 
Firms in the formal sector face the following timing of events. They use an existing 
technology in the first period. They decide whether or not to use a second 
technology in the second period. Following Lucas (1988) we assume that both 
technologies exhibit human capital externalities. However, given the historical 
discriminations in South Africa, and evidence of assymetric human capital 
externalities (see Michaud and Vencatachellum (2003)), these externalities differ 
depending on which technology is used. Three assumptions to the model are 
elaborated below: 
 
Assumption 1 (Existing Technology): The existing (old) technology uses only 
skilled labour for production and unskilled workers for menial jobs. Skilled and 
semi-skilled workers cannot be substituted. 
 
Aggregate output under the existing technology is as follows: 
 
 
              (1) 
 
where  is a scale function which captures human capital externalities  is the 
share of skilled workers among whites and measures whites' human capital, and  
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is the number of skilled workers.5  Equation (1) implicitly assumes that human 
capital externalities arise only from white workers. This assumption is made purely 
for simplicity and one could assume that is also a function of human capital for 
blacks. All our results would still hold provided that human capital externalities from 
black workers are not too high in technology (Assumption 1). Moreover, Section 4.3 
provides some reasons why (1) is a good representation of the existing technology 
in South Africa. 
 
Assumption 2 (New Technology): The second (new) technology uses both 
skilled and semi-skilled labour simultaneously as imperfect substitutes in the 
production process. Unskilled workers do menial jobs. 
 
Contrary to the existing (old) technology, in the new technology semi-skilled 
workers contribute actively to the production process where they are paid at their 
marginal product. As in Dessy and Vencatachellum (2003), let the amount of 
effective units of labour be equal to: 
 
                      (2) 
 
where  is the vector of shares of skilled blacks and whites,  and  
are the amount of semi-skilled and skilled workers respectively. 
 
Assumption 3 (Labour Productivity): Skilled workers are more productive than 
semi-skilled ones:  
 
The second technology is skill-biased and output equals: 
 
                             (3) 
 
where  is a scalar function. One difference between the two technologies is 
that aggregate human capital externalities arise from the aggregate human capital 
of both blacks and whites. This occurs because the use of semi-skilled workers 
                                                                
 
5 The production function (1) could make use of semi-skilled workers. However, with flexible wages and  
   perfect competition on the labour market, one would be unable to explain the collapse of the market  
   for semi-skilled workers. One would need to introduce rigidities on the unskilled labour market only.  
   Although this is clearly a possibility, we choose to use a perfectly competitive framework to show that  
   even in the absence of such rigidities, the market for semi-skilled workers may collapse because of  
   coordination failure. To that extent, resolving the coordination failure highlighted here is only a  
   necessary condition to solving the labour market problem in South Africa as explained in Section 4. 
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generates a positive externality for all workers. This externality cannot exist in the 
old technology because it does not use such workers by definition. 
 
Note that (3) does not assume the same external effect of black and white human 
capital. Indeed, evidence of very high, and different, intra-race human capital 
externalities is provided by Michaud and Vencatachellum (2003). It is also possible 
that if there are too few semi-skilled workers then technology (3) cannot be used. 
This would be similar to the existence of a threshold level of intermediate human 
capital similar to Azariadis and Drazen (1990).  Although such an explicit 
assumption is not made here because the measure of semi-skilled workers is 
exogenous, we will illustrate the possible implications of too few semi-skilled 
workers for the South African economy in Section 4. Finally, we could also assume 
that the scalar function  is also influenced by the measure of semi-skilled 
workers in the economy. Using (1) and (3), and the assumption of perfect 
competition, we now solve for wages under the two technologies. 
 
   2.2 Wages 
 
To guarantee that in equilibrium the total wage bill in the formal sector equals 
output in that sector, we assume that (i) a lump sum tax is levied on each skilled 
worker to pay unskilled workers, and (ii) both technologies use the same number of 
unskilled workers. This assumption means that each skilled worker pays the same 
non-distortionary tax irrespective of the technology and therefore can compare 
gross wages under the two technologies. Unskilled workers earn their reservation 
wage which is normalised to 1. This assumption reflects the large supply of 
unskilled workers in South Africa.  
 
As firms operate in a perfectly competitive environment, their equilibrium profits 
equal zero, and workers (except those who do menial jobs) are remunerated at 
their marginal product. It follows from (1) that skilled workers earn a gross wage, 
denoted , which equals: 
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Similarly, wages in the new technology (3) is given by: 
 
                    (5) 
 
                  (6) 
 
where   and    denote the gross wages of semi-skilled and skilled workers 
respectively. 
 
Recall that firms are already locked into the old technology which was chosen 
under apartheid, whose main objective was to maximize the welfare of whites. As 
in equilibrium firms earn zero profits, they should in theory be indifferent between 
the two technologies. However, they will adopt the second technology if and only if 
skilled (white) workers' wages do not fall. To see this assume a firm unilaterally 
decides to use the new technology even though skilled workers earn lower wages 
under that technology. Skilled workers from the deviating firm will migrate to other 
firms which are still using the old technology. As all firms are of measure zero and 
all markets are perfectly competitive, it follows that no firm will adopt the new 
technology unless skilled workers benefit from such a change. In other words 
  is a necessary and sufficient condition for firms to adopt the new 
technology. If that condition is met, then all firms will use the new technology. 
 
Given the assumption that all whites are skilled in the first period, and that human 
capital does not depreciate, it follows that  equals 1 in both periods. We 
therefore need to determine the share of semi-skilled blacks who train to become 
skilled workers. For notational simplification we drop the  subscript and refer to 
the share of skilled black workers simply as  in what follows. 
 
Lemma 1 (Threshold): There exists a threshold level of black workers human 
capital, denoted  ; below which skilled workers' wages under the existing 
technology exceeds those under the new technology. 
 
The threshold level of human capital arises because of the difference in the two 
production functions. Moreover, we do not need to assume the existence of an 
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   2.3 Preferences and Income 
 
We now turn to (black) semi-skilled agents' education investment decisions. If 
 denotes whether or not a black individual trains as a skilled worker,  
is the time allocated to working. We assume that agents' preferences are additively 
separable: 
 
                 (7) 
 
where   is consumption in period ; and  is the present value utility of 
consuming  units of the good in period 2. Equation (7) captures the fact that 
agents care about both their first and second period consumption, and therefore 
income. 
 
An agent's consumption in period  is equal to the wage received in that period 
because the numéraire good is non storable. In the first period the semi-skilled 
worker may either train to become a skilled worker, or because the old technology 
prevails take unskilled work (in the informal sector or menial formal sector jobs). If 
the worker takes the informal sector work, he receives a wage equal to 1 in the first 
period. Consequently his first-period income is the   sum of his endowment and 
wages, i.e. : However, if he trains his first-period income equals . 
 
In the second period a worker who has trained in the first period becomes a skilled 
worker whichever technology prevails. His second-period wage is given by either 
(4) or (6) depending on whether the old or the new technology is respectively used. 
If the worker has not trained, he works as a semi-skilled worker in the second 
period if the new technology is adopted and earns (5). However, if he has not 
trained, and the old technology is still used, he still works as an unskilled worker 
earning a wage of 1. In other words, semi-skilled human capital is only rewarded if 
the new technology is adopted. This has important implications for the equilibrium 
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More formally, let   denote a semi-skilled black worker's wage in period  : In the 
first period his wage is given by: 
 
                          (8) 
 
where we recall that  if the agent trains as a skilled worker, and  if he 
works. In the second period his wage is equal to: 
 
                 (9) 
 
where  is the skilled wage is given by (4) or (6) depending on whether the old or 
the new technology is respectively used, and  is the semi-skilled wage which 
equals 1 under the old technology or (5) under the new one. 
 
   3. Equilibrium 
3. Equilibrium 
Agents must form expectations on the share of blacks who train to become skilled 
workers. Each semi-skilled black agent compares his utility from attending school 
to train as a skilled worker in the first period or to take employment as an unskilled 
worker immediately. A semi-skilled black agent earns (9) in the second period. The 
benefit to a semi-skilled black agent of training as a skilled worker, when he 
expects a share  of semi-skilled blacks to attend the training program, equals:6 
   
                        (10) 
 
where  is implicitly defined and is the instantaneous marginal utility from 
consumption. As the utility function is monotone, increasing and strictly concave by 
assumption, it follows that  and  because of diminishing marginal 
utility. Moreover, we expect skilled workers to earn higher wages because of the 
difference in their marginal product. This is consistent with the findings of 
skillbiased technology literature: although the share of skilled workers has been 
increasing, their wages have also been increasing relative to those of unskilled 
                                                                
 
6 For notational simplification we drop the subscript in . 
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workers. As documented by Michaud and Vencatachellum (2003) for South Africa, 
the increased in demand for skilled workers, due to the increase in their 
productivity, dominates the increased supply. Hence it makes sense that 
for all  as a result of assumption 3, and that we 
assume in the old technology. 
 
As for all , ,  are continuous and  for any finite  , 
there exists a unique continuous differentiable function  that solves 
. Therefore, when expectations equal ; all semi-skilled blacks 
with a wealth greater than  train to become skilled workers and those who are 
poorer do not. Note that there is no guarantee that . We will return to 
this when we discuss the nature of the different equilibria. We are now in a position 
to advance a definition on the fulfillment of expectations at equilibrium as well as 
formulate two propositions which lead from our model. 
 
 
Definition 1 (Fulfilled Expectations Equilibrium): An equilibrium is a realized 
share   of blacks who train to become skilled workers such that agents'  
xpectations are fulfilled , their decisions are optimal, and the realized 
schooling rate solves: 
 
                (11) 
 
Hence, the equilibrium share(s) of blacks who train to become skilled workers is 
(are) the fixed point solution(s) to (11). 
 
Proposition 1 (Existence): 
(i) There always exists a fulfilled expectations equilibrium. 
(ii) The equilibrium where no black is a skilled worker does not always exist. 
 
The first part of Proposition 1 is a direct application of Brouwer's fixed-point 
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For instance Dessy and Vencatachellum (2003) show that no school enrolment is 
always an equilibrium in developing countries. The absence of such an (equivalent) 
equilibrium in all cases in our model occurs because post-1994 educated blacks 
can work as skilled workers even if firms retain the old technology and no other 
black becomes a skilled worker. Not only does legal discrimination no longer exist 
in South Africa, but there is evidence that skilled blacks are highly sought after.  
 
Assume the richest black thinks that no other black trains to be a skilled worker. In 
this case, using (10) the benefits to training as skilled-worker are positive if  is 
sufficiently high. However, it is also the case that no black attends school if even 
the richest black worker cannot afford to. In this case, an equilibrium where no 
black trains as a skilled worker exists. Given that in modern South Africa there is a 
positive measure of sufficiently wealthy blacks, the no-skilled blacks equilibrium is 
unlikely to be generated.7 
 
That all blacks train to become skilled workers is an equilibrium only if all are 
sufficiently rich. Consider for instance the poorest black whose expectations are 
that everyone attends school. Such an agent benefits from training to become a 
skilled worker if and only if the second-period wage differential is sufficiently high 
and  is not too negative. The last condition is not likely to hold for poor blacks. 
In this case, the marginal utility from first-period consumption is very large, and 
those blacks cannot afford to defer consumption to the next period. Hence, if some 
blacks are poorer than a wealth threshold, they do not attend school even if the 
expectations are that everyone else will train to become a skilled worker. As a 
significant share of black South Africans are at the subsistence level, it is unlikely 
that even the poorest black can afford to train as a skilled worker. Therefore that all 
blacks become skilled workers is unlikely to be generated as an equilibrium by the 
fundamentals of the South African economy. 
 
The share of blacks who train to become skilled workers as a function of the 
expectations   is as shown in Figure 1 (see Appendix). There exists a unique 
equilibrium  for an economy whose wealth distribution is given by  . Blacks are 
not rich enough to generate an equilibrium which is at least as high as the 
threshold level . In this economy, only policies which increase the wealth of the 
poorest may be effective in enticing firms to use the new technology. This can be 
achieved either by economic growth which trickles down, or income redistribution. 
 
                                                                
 
7 This means that in South Africa  
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Consider now the effect of income redistribution when the old apartheid-era 
technology is used. The government performs a mean-preserving Dalton wealth 
redistribution (Ray 1998). The share of blacks who become skilled workers after 
such a policy is illustrated by the new cumulative wealth  distribution in Figure 1. 
In this case, for all expectations  more blacks train to become skilled 
workers. The function  shifts up and a new equilibrium, where a larger 
share of blacks are skilled workers, is obtained. In this example, multiple equilibria 
arise after depending on black agents' expectations on  when there is a 
sufficient measure of relatively rich blacks. 
 
Proposition 2 (Multiple equilibria): Assume there exists an  such that 
 
                 (12) 
 
and some individuals cannot become skilled workers when the expectations are 
that everyone will become skilled  . Then such an economy 
exhibits three school-enrolment equilibria. 
 
When the conditions given in Proposition 2 hold, then the share of blacks who 
choose to become skilled workers is as illustrated in Figure 1. In this case there are 
three fixed-point equilibria which solve (11): (i) a low one  which is below , (ii) 
an intermediate unstable equilibrium  which is also lower than , and (iii) a high 
equilibrium . On the one hand, if the  equilibrium is selected, firms adopt 
the new technology in the second period and both semi-skilled and skilled blacks 
and skilled whites are winners. On the other hand if   is selected, the old 
technology is retained. Then semi-skilled workers can work only in the informal 
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Therefore, if the new economy generates multiple equilibria, and selects that where 
the new technology is not adopted, there are Pareto-improving policies. Such 
policies ensure that the economy selects the equilibrium where the share of blacks 
who train as skilled workers is greater than the threshold level . An example of 
such a policy is for the government to implement and enforce compulsory training 
laws. It could also endeavor to reduce the cost of training borne by the individuals. 
Hence, the important factors are the low aggregate human capital of blacks, and 
the reluctance of firms to adopt new technologies unless it is Pareto-improvi ng for 
skilled (mostly white) workers.   
 
Note that in theory economic growth which has a trickle down effect under the old 
technology would be another way to remove the coordination failure. For this to 
occur, the wages and wealth of the poor blacks would have to increase sufficiently. 
This cannot happen in our model because poor blacks work as unskilled workers 
and earn their constant reservation wage. However, one could think of a dynamic 
setup where the wages of unskilled workers increase over time and their children 
would be able to afford to train as skilled workers. However, such a situation is not 
realistic for South Africa because unemployment of unskilled workers is increasing, 
and unskilled wages have not shown significant real gains during the past 10 years 
(SAIRR 2002). 
 
   4. Human Capital and Technological Choice in South Africa 
 
We now give evidence that the coordination failure described in Sections 2 and 3 is 
a good explanation for the current employment situation in South Africa. We 
acknowledge other explanations which include: rigidities from labour market 
institutions (Boccara and Moll 1997), and the changing structure of South African 
industry in response to such factors as trade liberalisation (Edwards 2001). 
 
Resolving the coordination failure which is highlighted in this paper should only be 
viewed as a necessary condition for there to be a demand for less-skilled workers 
in the formal sector. We start with a brief description of early apartheid South Africa 
in Section 4.1. This serves two purposes. First, South Africa's current problems are  
largely a function of its history. Second, as Verwoerd's words suggest, conditions in 
early apartheid illustrate the coordination failure demonstrated in Sections 2 and 3. 
We then show in Section 4.2 that blacks have low human capital and wealth, and 
in Section 4.3 that South African firms nowadays are using more skill intensive 
technology. 
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   4.1 Apartheid 
 
Early apartheid (up to around 1930) was buttressed by a coordination failure as we 
describe in sections 2 and 3. Mining and agriculture were the dominant sectors 
(Nattrass 1981). For technological reasons the mines required large quantities of 
skilled labour and even larger quantities of unskilled labour (Austen 1987, p. 165). 
The requirement for skilled labour was largely met by whites. In order to meet its 
unskilled labour requirement, the mining houses, with the assistance of the state, 
engineered a monopsonistic labour market for black labour. This system worked by 
repressing economic alternatives of blacks (for example by restricting the amount 
of land available to them), by exerting close supervision both on the job and in 
black workers urban quarters, and by maintaining a system of circular migration 
from rural areas rather than allowing blacks to settle permanently in urban areas.8 
 
Agriculture presented a similar picture (Nattrass 1981, p. 106-107). Apart from the 
repression of subsistence and market oriented black agriculture, white farms 
(which employed an increasing black workforce) required mainly unskilled labour 
and made use of the same methods of labour control as the mines. In 
manufacturing, which began to emerge as a significant sector after 1910 (Bell and 
Madula 2002), early production was dominated by the craft system (Webster, 1985: 
32-39). Blacks were confined to unskilled jobs, with white craft unions monopolising 
access to skilled work directly through closed shop arrangements and indirectly 
though the control of the apprenticeship system. The technology was such that 
there was very little semi-skilled work. Thus the technology in those three sectors is 
well approximated by our existing (old) technology described in assumption 1. 
 
In this period, black educational attainments remained low. Even by 1970, 82 
percent of black males had not received any secondary education (Nattrass 1981, 
p. 47). The principle factor does not seem to be direct government repression. 
Rather, the early apartheid economy simply did not need skilled or semi-skilled 
blacks. Neither the government, nor individual blacks, had any strong incentive to 
invest in black education. Apart from its effects in reinforcing prejudice, the racial 
casting of blacks as disenfranchised, unskilled, rural “uncivilised” labour Lipton 
(1985, p. 20, 261- 64), meant that employers had little inc entive initially to adopt 
new technologies. This is consistent with our model in that the share of educated 
blacks fell below the threshold for firms to benefit from changing technology. 
 
                                                                
 
8 An indicator of the control achieved over black labour is that black mining real wages remained  
   virtually constant until 1970 (Hofmeyr 1994). 
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However, technological change in the manufacturing sector had occurred in other 
countries to the extent that by the 1930s craft work had been replaced by 
repetitive, machine-based semi-skilled work (Webster, 1985: 45). This change 
happened gradually in South Africa. This together with the increasing importance of 
manufacturing implied a large demand for semi-skilled and skilled workers which 
could only be met by blacks. Allowing such a change would have meant that the 
level of black human capital would have exceeded the threshold. However, it was 
only by the 1950s that it begun to translate to significant gains for blacks. Firstly, 
“deskilling” was initially successfully resisted by the craft unions (Webster 1985, p. 
39). Secondly, because of the significant poor white problem (Wilson and 
Ramphele 1989) the new semi-skilled operator jobs could initially be filled mainly 
with white labour.9  Thirdly, semi-skilled jobs could apparently be filled by workers 
with little education.10 
 
These factors merely delayed matters. By the end of World War II, white unions 
had lost most of their power, and most importantly, economic growth had created a 
labour shortage which could not be filled by poor whites as the “poor-white” 
problem had been solved (Wilson and Ramphele 1989, p. 318). Thus, while before 
the 1940s whites accounted for about forty percent of manufacturing jobs, by 1950, 
blacks were beginning to dominate semi-skilled jobs and were even penetrating 
skilled occupations in significant numbers (Industrial Legislation Commission, 
quoted by Lipton (1985, p. 39)). 
 
Consistent with a higher demand for skilled and semi-skilled blacks, there is 
evidence of increasing black education from the 1940s onwards (Fedderke and 
Luiz 2002, Figure 1). An indicator of the recognition of the increasing importance of 
Black education for economic development was the passage of the National 
Education Finance Act in 1945. Prior to this, black education had to be financed 
though money raised through African taxes (Lipton 1985, p. 21). In short, there is 
evidence that “[t]he black vanguard was overtaking the bottom group of whites” 
(Lipton 1985, p. 19). This would be consistent with the economy breaking out of the 




                                                                
 
9 Indeed on railways, between 1924 and 1932 the number of unskilled white laborers increased from 6  
   363 to 12 042, while the number of Africans employed fell from 35 532 to 17 467 (Webster, 1985: 47). 
 
10 Webster (1985: 61) comments that [by the late 1940s] although Africans had moved into semi-skilled  
   jobs, they  were largely unskilled laborers “ 
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Faced with this erosion of apartheid, the newly elected Nationalist Party acted. 
Verwoerd's words (quoted at the beginning of the paper) therefore constitute a 
statement of intent to halt the erosion of apartheid by entrenching it through 
legislation and policies. For example (i) the Bantu Education Act, which was a 
direct attempt to undermine black education, (ii) urbanisation policies whereby 
Africans did not have permanent urban rights, and (iii) the re-entrenchment of the 
job colour bar. The government sought to encourage capital-intensive production 
through industrial policies, and hence reduce the reliance of industry on black 
labour. These policies resulted in a highly distorted economy by the end of 
apartheid. We argue in the next section that these distortions have long run effects 
on technological choice, black human capital and wealth. 
   4.2 Human Capital and Wealth in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
 
We now document that post-apartheid human capital and wealth distributions of 
black South Africans are consistent their aggregate human capital falling below the 
threshold  described in Lemma 1. First, the quality of black education was poor 
under apartheid, and there are indicators that it subsequently has not improved 
significantly. During that period, Black education was of very poor quality because 
of its ideological content, the misallocation of resources by the government, and 
African schools becoming a center of political resistance rather than learning 
(Davenport and Saunders 2000).11 It is unlikely that the quality of education for 
blacks has significantly improved recently (Case and Yogo (1999) and Hosking 
(2000)). Case and Yogo (1999), for instance, report that the government has 
increased the salaries of black teachers at the expense of pupil/teacher ratio and 
other school resources. 
 
It is of interest to quantify the human capital of the cohort educated under 
apartheid. This group is important because it constitutes the current 30-55 age 
group and thus most of the black labour force. Van der Berg (2002, p.296) 
contends that within this cohort, many of those who attended school to grade 11 
fail basic literacy and numeracy tests. Using the 1999 October Household Survey, 
we find that 83 percent of black labour market participants have at most a grade 11 
education. It follows that a large share of the black labour force may have low 
levels of skills. There is also evidence that poor training is an important determinant 
                                                                
 
11 Chisholm (1992, p. 281) contends that under late apartheid (1960-1994), despite rising black  
   enrolment and education expenditure, illiteracy and innumeracy increased. Bhorat et al. (2001) also  
   report that numeracy and literacy skills for blacks aged 13 to 18 in 1993 were only about half that  
   achieved by whites. 
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of labour market performance. For instance, in the 1999 October Household 
Survey, 69 percent of those who are unemployed say they cannot get a job 
because they lack skills or qualifications. 
 
Second, even after apartheid, high enrolment does not necessarily mean an 
effective education because of high poverty among black households (Bhorat et al. 
2001), the quality of education, and parental and peer group effects (Case and 
Deaton 1999). As approximately half of black households are below the poverty 
line (Bhorat et al. 2001), very few can afford to have their children complete 
secondary school. An indicator of this is the significance of child labour in South 
Africa (Budlender and Bosch 2002), despite it being illegal and education being 
compulsory. Moreover, schools in poor communities are less likely to be of decent 
quality and children in these communities may obtain little support at home (see 
the maps in Case and Yogo (1999)). 
 
Third, many blacks may have little commitment to education because of the few 
semi-skilled jobs, and the commodity boom (coupled to unionisation) which led to 
high unskilled wages (Bell and Madula 2002, p. 103-104). Indeed, since around 
1975, the emergence of massive unemployment at the unskilled and semi-skilled 
levels has meant that only those who complete secondary education have a good 
chance of getting decent work. Youth unemployment is particularly important in this 
regard: in 1997, only 55 per cent of black men and 33 percent of black women 
aged 26-30 worked (authors' calculation from the 1997 October Household 
Survey). This would confirm the pessimistic expectations of the current generation 
of school-goers. 
 
   4.3 Technological Choice in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
 
In the years since the end of apartheid, formal sector employment in South Africa 
has increased in highly skilled categories only. It has decreased at the intermediate 
and unskilled level. Although these decreases may have been offset to a certain 
extent by informal sector employment, all indicators are that unemployment is high 
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and rising at the intermediate and unskilled levels.12 The experience of low-skilled 
workers is one of retrenchment and informalisation (Standing, Sender and Weeks 
1996, Kenny and Webster 1998, Friedman 2002). As Baskin (1998, p.998) puts it 
“...unfortunately, many larger firms prefer to go the high wage-high productivity-low 
staff complement route.” There is also evidence that skills training efforts by firms 
are extremely low (Vavi 2002), reinforcing the human capital problems we have 
documented. 
 
Our model is consistent with these trends. It predicts that in South African 
conditions, firms select skill-intensive technologies. Less skilled workers are 
confined to low skill, informal sector jobs or unemployment. The labour market 
does not reward human capital until someone qualifies as a skilled worker. Hence 
there are no returns to primary education. The most important test of whether 
South Africa is in such a coordination failure is what is occurring at the semi-skilled 
level. Declining employment and high unemployment suggest that there is an 
excess supply of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Indeed, compared to other 
middle income countries, South Africa may seem to be well endowed at the semi-
skilled level (Bell and Madula 2002, p. 120). However, we argue that there are too 
few skilled and semi-skilled blacks. Ironically, therefore, although the critical 
problem is a lack of such workers, the collapse in the demand of semi-skilled 
workers caused by firms' consequent technological choice, induces a surplus of 
semi-skilled individuals. 
 
What distinguishes our explanation from others is its ability to address the evidence 
that no sector in South Africa has adopted a semi-skilled intensive technology. 
Other arguments blame either employers implementing discriminating policies, or 
labour market distortions caused by strong unions and worker-friendly legislation 
(Baskin, 1998). However, even in sectors where unionisation and labour law is 
minimal, the tendency not to use semi-skilled workers is at least as strong as in 
more protected sectors. These arguments therefore cannot explain the 
performance of South Africa's informal sector. Several authors have commented 
that South Africa's informal sector is small compared to similar countries. What 
seems to be lacking is a significant tier of intermediate skill activities (Berry 2001). 
 
                                                                
 
12 South Africa emerged from apartheid with a capital and skill intensive production structure which is at  
   odds with abundant unskilled labor. Post-apartheid skill and capital deepening seem to have  
   continued as evidenced by (i) increased employment of skilled workers, (ii) a fall in semi and unskilled  
   employment in the mining, construction and manufacturing sectors, and (iii) increased capital intensity  
   in the last three sectors (see Bell and Madula (2002, p. 119) for a survey of the evidence, Edwards  
   (2001) and Samson, MacQuene and van Niekerk (2002)). These authors agree that South Africa is  
   different from other developing countries in the extent of these distortions. 
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The trend highlighted for South Africa, and our explanation, is partly supported by 
the experience of other countries. Many countries in Asia (Breman 1996) and Latin 
America (Berry 2001) have similar problems with low skill workers facing either 
unemployment or poor work in unprotected jobs that do not reward marginal 
human capital. Our analysis suggests that poverty and aggregate human capital 
attainments are decisive factors in the retention of technologies that make use of 
semi-skilled workers. There is some support for this argument. It has been argued 
for example that relatively egalitarian income distributions and relatively high 
human capital attainments were important preconditions for the growth of the newly 
industrialised countries (Wilkinson 1994). 
 
 
   5. Policy Implications and Conclusion 
 
We ask why South Africa has lost close to one million jobs since 1989, and why, 
contrary to most other developing countries, there are no returns to primary 
education. Using a two-period model where agents invest in education to become 
skilled workers, we show that unless the aggregate level of blacks' human capital is 
sufficiently high, skilled workers earn lower wages in a technology which uses all 
types of labour than in the apartheid-inherited technology. It is therefore not optimal 
for skilled workers, who are mostly white, that firms adopt the new technology 
unless the aggregate human capital of black workers is sufficiently high. Any firm 
which switches unilaterally to the new technology would lose all its skilled workers 
who would be offered better jobs by firms using the apartheid era technology. 
Hence in equilibrium, firms are locked into the old equilibrium as a large share of 
the black population is too poor to become skilled workers. Redistribution is not 
sufficient to solve the coordination failure problem if multiple equilibria exist and 
expectations are such that a low school enrolment equilibrium is selected. 
 
We then provide evidence about human capital stocks, poverty rates, and the 
nature of technological choice in South Africa. These characteristics were partially 
inherited from apartheid, but the evidence suggests that neither the gradual decline 
of apartheid since the 1970, nor the end of apartheid in 1994, stimulated any 
recovery. South Africa thus appears to fit our coordination failure model well. 
Moreover, our assessment of the evidence suggests that our explanation 
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Our analysis has important implications which relate both to the type and scale of 
the policies. Firstly, if the problem is coordination failure, reform of, for example, 
labour law may be futile. Such reform may make labour cheaper, but if the human 
capital characteristics of the labour force are wrong, the response to lower labour 
costs may be very inelastic. Secondly, one is struck by the apparent failure of post-
apartheid policies that have attempted to address the problems. Our analysis 
suggests that (a) policy efforts have to be of a sufficient scale to move South Africa 
above the critical human capital threshold and (b) coordinated policy is required to 
address the factors locking South Africa into the coordination trap. 
 
Education policy illustrates these points. We have presented evidence that returns 
to education are nil for all those with less than secondary school education. The 
obvious implication is that the government should focus its effort at getting people 
right through the education system. This is consistent with the observation that 
there are shortages of skilled labour and weak demand for intermediate and 
unskilled workers. Our analysis highlights that the government should not neglect 
primary and secondary education. Not only the quality of human capital needs to 
be improved (as other authors have argued), but also its quantity. 
 
The human capital problem may seem the most severe, and addressing it is the 
most direct way out of the coordination failure. However, our analysis suggest that 
failure to address the other two factors (the highly skewed distribution of income 
and the tendency of firms to choose skill intensive technologies) could result in 
costly failure. For example, as long as there are so few job opportunities for people 
who do not complete secondary education, commitment to education is likely to 
remain low. Technology policy and efforts to encourage firms to train workers (such 
as the Skills Development program) therefore have important complementary roles. 
Similarly, deep poverty is likely to undermine the effectiveness of education. 
 
Finally it is important to comment on both the limitations and the significance of our 
study. We only describe the main elements of the coordination failure and can only 
indicate which policies are likely to be important. We do not explore the optimal 
policy mix, although we believe our model provides a useful starting point for such 
an exploration. Despite these limitations, the paper provides an important insight 
into the policies that are likely to be successful in South Africa. We show that the 
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   7.2  Proof of Lemma 1 
 
A white skilled worker's wage under the new technology is higher than under the 
old technology if and only if: 
 
     (13) 
 
Note that both  and  are monotone increasing in ; while the right 
handside of equation (13) is a constant because  is at its maximum level by 
assumption. If follows that there are two possibilities. Either  and  are not 
increasing enough in  in which case skilled workers wages in the new technology 
can never exceed those under the old one. Second, those two functions are 
increasing enough in  such that there exists a threshold level  which holds for 




   7.3  Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Since the functions  and  are continuous by assumption, it follows that the 
implicit function  is also continuous. Since (i) is by definition non-empty, 
compact and convex, (ii) , and (iii)   is continuous, we can 
appeal to Brouwer's fixed point theorem which guarantees a solution to (11). 
 
   7.4  Proof of Proposition 2 
 
We first construct a more equal economy than the benchmark one by performing 
Dalton transfers. Let . The more equal economy is constructed from  and 
has as wealth support . The transfers are such that those who choose 
to train as skilled workers prior to the transfers still choose to become skilled 
workers. As for those who did not choose to train as skilled workers previously, 
some are now made rich enough that they choose to become skilled workers. 
Hence, for each value of  more people choose to train as skilled workers and 
shifts upwards to . Three equilibria exist if there exists at some 
value  such that  as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
